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Abstract 
We ask whether ethnic density in Swedish comprehensive schools affect teacher-assigned 
school grades in ninth grade (age 16). The data, based on two entire cohorts who graduated in 
1998 and 1999 (188,000 pupils and 1,043 schools), link school information with Census data 
on social origin, and enable us to distinguish first- from second generation immigrants. Using 
multilevel analysis we find the proportion of first, but not the second, generation immigrant 
pupils in a school to depress grades in general, but particularly for (first generation) 
immigrant pupils. Passing a threshold of more than 40 percent immigrants reduces grades 
with around a fifth of a standard deviation, affecting fourteen percent of immigrant children. 
Our main results are robust to model specifications which address omitted variable bias both 
at individual- and school-level. One policy implication of our results is that desegregation 
policies which concentrated on the two per cent most segregated schools would probably 
improve school results and reduce ethnic inequality. 
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Hierarchical models 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many countries have recently experienced a rapid increase in immigration, and concomitant 
changes in their ethnic mix. This is true for the U.S.A. during the last two-three decades (e.g., 
Lee and Bean 2004), and likewise for parts of Europe: Countries such as Sweden, Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, and Austria now have, like the U.S.A, an immigrant population 
around 12-15 %, with a growing number of native-born children of immigrants (OECD 2003). 
Many Western countries share not only in the experience of large-scale immigration, but also 
in the ethnic spatial concentration to and segregation within large city areas that typically 
follows (e.g., Musterd 2005; Charles 2003). As a result, many have expressed concern for the 
conditions and opportunities of children in urban residential areas with a high concentration of 
ethnic minorities, often characterized also by socioeconomic disadvantages.
1 In particular, this 
concern has focused on their school results and educational attainment as a basis for their 
chances in the labor market and for their integration at large. 
                                                 
1 We follow the convention and use the term “ethnic” in some instances (as in “ethnic 
segregation/density/concentration”, which we use interchangeably) to denote the distribution or 
clustering of people of different immigrant statuses according to their own and/or their parents’ 
country of birth (which is the information we have access to). We are aware, however, that the proper 
use of the term “ethnic” should require information about religion, language, cultural belonging etc. 
(immigrants from Turkey to Sweden, for example, consist of at least three ethnic groups: Turks, 
Kurds, and Syrians). Sociological theories of role models, collective socialization, and peer processes 
indeed suggest that the concentration of disadvantaged families in neighborhoods and schools 
will have negative consequences for children’s school achievement. There is also a number of 
empirical studies showing the importance of the socioeconomic composition of schools for 
educational outcomes (Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 2002, Robertson and Symons 2003, 
Willms 1986; Erikson 1994), suggesting that socioeconomic segregation depresses 
educational achievement for those who live in disadvantaged areas, where children of 
immigrants are over-represented. There is a related body of studies of neighborhood effects 
(see Garner and Raudenbush 1991; Borjas 1995; Brooks-Gunn, Duncan and Aber 1997, and 
reviews by Dietz 2002; Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley 2002; Durlauf 2004), 
showing that “middle-class” residential areas are overall associated with better achievements 
of pupils, even when controlling for characteristics of their own family of origin (though the 
causal nature of these associations is contested). 
Studies of racial segregation in the U.S.A. conclude that also such segregation tends to 
depress school achievement (Boozer, Krueger, and Wolkon 1992; Grogger 1996; Cutler and 
Glaeser 1997; Hoxby 2000; Hanushek et al. 2002), though there are mixed findings in 
previous research, probably due to differences in methodology and in data (Hanushek et al. 
2002; Durlauf 2004). However, as pointed out by several researchers (e.g., Ellen et al. 2002), 
we know rather little about the effects of ethnic concentration due to recent immigration, in 
the U.S.A. or elsewhere. Though there are some common sociological mechanisms, 
immigration has somewhat different dynamics in relation to segregation than race. The spatial 
segregation of immigrants is partly a phenomenon of ‘population shock’ when (sometimes 
large numbers of) newcomers tend to cluster in separate, often underprivileged, residential 
areas (e.g., Jensen 2001). Such ethnic concentration produces communities where 
disadvantage may be maintained across generations due to lack of language proficiency, limiting networks, and distance to the majority culture (e.g., Borjas 1995; Portes and 
Rumbaud 2001). However, such disadvantage tends to be erased in the third generation (Alba 
and Knee 2003) and some immigrant groups are relatively resourceful, especially with regard 
to human capital and skills, and exhibit high educational aspirations (e.g., Similä 1994; 
Goyette and Xie 1999). A systematic ethnic segregation – where immigrants in general are 
isolated from the majority population – may thus, at least in theory, create residential areas 
that are more beneficial for children than those produced purely by a concentration of 
socioeconomic disadvantage (cf. Cutler and Glaeser 1997). 
The academic interest as well as the social policy relevance of the question whether 
ethnic segregation reduces children’s educational opportunity are obvious. What is far from 
obvious, however, is how to estimate such segregation effect empirically. There are few data-
sets that are large enough to assess contextual effects with precision, and a major obstacle is 
the problem of estimating causal effects from observational data. Thus, many previous studies 
suffer from inefficient and/or biased estimates of segregation effects (cf. the critical reviews 
by Dietz 2002 and Durlauf 2004). The problem is mainly due to two social phenomena that 
generate bias. First, families may sort themselves into neighborhoods and schools on the basis 
of unmeasured characteristics that are likely to be correlated with the studied outcome, as 
when parents with high aspirations for their children move to majority population areas. 
Second, schools in ethnic minority areas may have less resources and therefore greater 
difficulties to attract qualified teachers than schools in other districts. What we register as 
negative effects of ethnic segregation may in these cases be a function of other, unobserved 
characteristics of pupils and schools, resulting in omitted variable bias. 
This study addresses the question to what extent ethnic segregation in Swedish 
comprehensive schools, following recent immigration waves, has consequences for pupils’ 
school achievements; and whether such consequences are evident for native children to a lesser or same extent as immigrant children. The answers to these questions have bearing both 
on issues of societal efficiency and inequality. We draw on a unique data set, comprising two 
entire cohorts of public school pupils in the last grade of comprehensive school (aged 16). For 
these 188,000 respondents, information on teacher-assigned grades has been matched with 
individual-level registry data on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of their 
family of origin. On the basis of these data, we have been able to create precise and reliable 
measures of the socioeconomic and ethnic composition of schools (n=1,043). We can 
distinguish first- from second-generation immigrants, giving us an opportunity of addressing 
specific hypotheses about contextual mechanisms.  
We use multilevel analyses, with pupils nested within schools, to estimate ethnic 
segregation effects, controlling for a set of relevant, observed variables both at 
individual/family and school level. To reduce the problem of omitted variable bias we 
perform two tests. First, using longitudinal information on previous residential mobility of 
respondents we are able to check to what extent population sorting influences the segregation 
effect. Second, a model fitting within-school slopes (equal to a fixed effects model in 
econometrics) addresses the problem of omitted variables at school level. Because the 
problem of bias is both crucial for our understanding of social phenomena and very rarely 
addressed in sociology, we devote a full section to this issue. 
What makes the case of Sweden particularly interesting is that it combines a recent 
history of high immigration rates and subsequent ethnic segregation (comparable with other 
nations) with relatively equal living conditions and a low degree of stratification between 
schools. Our finding that ethnic segregation depresses children’s school achievement is likely 
to contain an important generic component and thus be possible to generalize to other 
countries with similar experience of immigration and ethnic concentration. This is because the 
micro-sociological processes behind are of a general nature: Potential problems with language proficiency and instruction in schools with many immigrants as well as the transmission of 
aspirations and skills between peers, and between adults and children within local 
communities, are part and parcel of social life, no matter the longitude and latitude. At the 
same time, the effects of ethnic segregation are likely to be of varying strength depending on 
macro-sociological circumstances, such as general social inequality, stratification between 
schools, the composition of ethnic minorities, and the reception of immigrants. As we 
describe below, welfare state intervention in Sweden guarantees a base-line living standard 
for ethnic minorities; and schools in ethnic minority areas get compensatory resources. 
Because such social policy is likely to mitigate negative consequences of ethnic segregation 
on school results, we believe that the case of Sweden represents a strategic conservative test 
of segregation effects and our results thus may provide a lower-bound estimate of such 
effects. 
We proceed with a discussion of theories of ethnic segregation effects and a review of 
findings from previous studies, after which we give a more elaborate description of the case 
of Sweden. Our empirical analyses, including a discussion of the robustness of our findings, 
follow. We conclude with a discussion of the results, how these may inform social policy, and 
their generalizability to other countries. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In understanding differences in school grades, parental resources and behavior are essential. 
Theories focus on early (pre-school) socialization as well as parental support during the 
school years in the forms of continuous socialization, transmission of educational aspirations, 
economic resources, good advice on how to navigate the school system, and engagement in 
and practical help with the school work (e.g., Schneider and Coleman 1993; Erikson and 
Jonsson 1996).  Over and above pupils’ own “family context” (such as their social background), 
typically measured at the individual level, the composition of families in neighborhoods and 
schools may also have an impact on performance in school, as may various macro-
characteristics of this context. There are three basic processes behind (cf. Jencks and Mayer 
1990). First, adults that a student meets or relates to (such as friends’ parents) may function as 
role models, transfer skills, disseminate social norms, and exercise social control (e.g., 
Coleman and Hoffer 1987; Sampson et al. 2002; Crowder and South 2003). Secondly, peers 
influence each other: because pupils do homework together, for example, each one’s skills 
and aspirations (and indirectly their parents’ human capital), exert an influence on the other 
(e.g., Winston and Zimmerman 2004). To be sure, school mates also make a difference in the 
class-room situation, either by helping each other or in some other way contribute to a 
productive learning environment, or by various negative influences (as in contagion theories; 
see also Lazear 2001). Thirdly, institutional resources are likely to impact on students’ 
achievements. These may stem from local libraries, churches or youth organizations; but for 
adolescents, characteristics of schools are of utmost importance. Previous research has 
emphasized school climate, efficacy in instruction, economic resources (and the correlated 
dimensions teacher quality and class sizes), and norms and educational aspirations (e.g., Lee 
and Bryk 1989; Scheerens and Bosker 1997; Gustafsson 2003; Roscigno, Tomaskovic-Devey, 
and Crowley 2006).  
As the two first processes – collective socialization and peer influence – highlight 
social interaction effects they are of particular sociological relevance.
2 Spatial segregation, 
                                                 
2 The third, institutional effect is also of great social policy relevance. For a comprehensive study of 
school effects, see Mortimer at al (1988); Sheerens and Bosker (1997) provide a useful review. 
Particularly within economics, there are many studies of whether and to what extent school resources according to such theories, means that a clustering of children from less resourceful families 
in a school makes pupils face less opportunities of learning, lower educational aspirations, a 
lack of role models that value education and schoolwork; and that pupils receive less relevant 
and adequate information about the educational system and the labor market. This is akin to 
problems assigned to minority children due to the “social isolation” from the majority society 
in segregated inner-city areas (Wilson 1987), and due to the absence of what is sometimes 
termed positive “spill-over effects” or human-capital externalities (Borjas 1995).  
These general theoretical ideas apply to segregation in all forms, where families with 
more resources are residing in different areas and their children attending different schools, 
than those less resourceful. As immigrant families on average belong to the latter category, 
we expect children in these families to face a “gross” disadvantage in school (though this will 
vary with immigration circumstances and characteristics of the ethnic group). Controlling for 
socioeconomic resources we also expect lasting segregation effects stemming from ethnic 
concentration. Why is that? Obviously, immigrant parents typically have little experience 
from and information on the educational system and labor market, and have often not 
developed out-group social networks that may help in getting ahead in a new country. Their 
human capital – most obviously language proficiency and educational credentials – are often 
not compatible with demands in the labor market, making the transmission of relevant skills 
to children (and, indirectly, to friends to their children) less efficient.
3 One can even 
hypothesize that their small return to higher education leads children who observe this to 
                                                                                                                                                         
have a causal effect on output, i.e., student achievement; see Hanushek (2002) and Krueger (2002) and 
references therein. 
3 They can function as positive role models nonetheless, of course, and their general abilities and 
aspirations can be transmitted to children: but here, a limiting mechanism may be that ethnic networks 
may be narrow, not allowing for so much positive spill-over effects between ethnic minority groups. underestimate their expected benefits from educational attainment and therefore exert less 
effort in school (cf. Breen and Peñalosa 2002).
4 A concentration of immigrants, in some 
neighborhoods and schools, who have experienced war, persecution, and involuntary 
emigration, may amplify disadvantages such as social and psychological problems in both 
parents and children. In general, we (also) expect neighborhoods with a large proportion of 
relatively newly arrived immigrants of different ethnic origins to show less social cohesion 
and collective efficacy, because norm-setting as well as social control are facilitated by 
homogeneity and residential stability (Sampson et al. 2002).  
In school, a concentration of pupils who do not master the language of instruction may 
create problems with efficient teaching; this is of course readily derived from basic didactic 
theory, and is also predicted from a model in which disruptions during class determine student 
outcomes (Lazear 2001).  
Finally, in ethnically segregated social spaces opportunities for cross-group 
interactions is lower and ethnic closure in interpersonal networks become more pronounced 
(Sanders 2002).
5 Those from ethnically disadvantaged backgrounds are therefore more 
exposed to environments that cannot aid in or do not promote school achievement, and a lack 
of contact with native peers has negative effects on immigrant children’s integration into the 
host society – consequently, we expect ethnic segregation to depress school performance 
                                                 
4 While mainstream culture of individual success may be wide-spread in segregated neighbourhoods, 
opportunities for individual progress may nonetheless be perceived as strongly limited (e.g., 
Ainsworth 2002). 
5 This may to some degree be counterbalanced by the fact that the propensity of cross-group 
interaction is higher in more heterogeneous school environments than in strongly segregated ones, 
probably because in-group interaction becomes more plausible as the minority group increases in size 
(Moody 2001). particularly for children from minority backgrounds (cf. Borjas 1995). Another consequence 
of the processes discussed above is that we assume negative contextual effects to be more 
pervasive for first-generation than for second-generation immigrants: the former have overall 
less resources (in particular language skills), their parents have not been economically 
integrated to the same extent as those who arrived earlier, and they are less likely to profit 
from majority population networks.  
While it is rather straightforward to hypothesize that there are negative ethnic 
segregation effects on pupil outcomes, it is difficult to envisage at what level of segregation 
they become apparent. Most studies use linear models, implicitly assuming that the effect of 
ethnic concentration is the same across the distribution. A corollary of great policy relevance 
is that a redistribution of immigrant groups – through housing programs, for example – would 
have no overall effect (cf. Jencks and Mayer 1990). In difference to this, epidemic models, 
often used when studying deviant behavior, assume accelerating effects and therefore a 
possibility of increasing overall educational standards by desegregation policies. Such a 
model has been applied to school achievement by Crane (1991) who found a tipping point 
where children living in the four percentages least advantaged neighborhoods were 
disproportionally more likely to drop out of high school. We believe that it is reasonable to 
expect threshold effects of ethnic concentration, but we see no theoretical reason that these 
should occur at a particular degree of segregation. 
What we set out to test empirically are the hypotheses that:  
1.  ethnic segregation is correlated with school outcomes, so that the larger the 
fraction of first- and second-generation immigrants in a school, the lower the 
school achievements;  2.  this correlation is partly dependent on differences in socioeconomic resources, 
but even controlling for such resources ethnic segregation will have a general 
negative impact on school achievement; 
3.  this negative effect is weakest for pupils born in Sweden by Swedish-born 
parents; 
4.  resource convergence and assimilation across generations make the negative 
impact of ethnic concentration less for second-generation than for first-
generation immigrants. 
5.  ethnic segregation effects accelerate as ethnic concentration in schools gets to a 
certain point. 
THE SWEDISH SETTING 
Sweden used to be ethnically relatively homogeneous with net emigration up to the 1940s, but 
has experienced increasing ethnic diversity following several immigration waves: first, in 
relation to World War II, by immigrants from Germany and the Baltic states; secondly, in the 
1950s and 1960s, by labor market immigrants (predominantly from other Nordic countries 
and from Southern Europe) and political refugees (from former East Bloc countries and Latin 
America); thirdly, as a result of recent immigration waves in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly 
from former Yugoslavia and from western Asia. As is shown in Appendix Table A1, this 
means that around half of the immigrant children in our study come from outside Europe 
(primarily from Iran, Turkey, Chile, and Iraq) and 30 per cent from South- and Eastern 
Europe. At present, Sweden has an internationally high percentage of foreign-born of around 
12 per cent (OECD 2003; Statistics Sweden 2004). In our sample, consisting of children born 
1982-83, 7.8 per cent are first generation immigrants and 4.6 per cent are second generation 
immigrants (Table 1a). Though a government program in the period 1984-94 sought to 
distribute immigrants across municipalities most end up in metropolitan areas, and residential segregation is relatively high (Andersson 1998). Overall segregation indices (contrasting 
foreign-born with Swedish-born) are between 0.3 and 0.4, though for recent non-European 
immigrant groups they are as high as 0.5 to 0.8 (Andersson 2000).
6 
Thus, Sweden nowadays displays both a large proportion of foreign-born and 
relatively strong ethnic segregation, like many comparable countries in the Western world. 
What makes Sweden a special case is predominantly the way social policy reduces poverty 
rates and ensures relatively equal standards of living between the native and the foreign-born 
groups. This is partly a result of an all-encompassing and generous social security system, 
partly because benefits in kind equalize opportunities. For our purposes, it is most important 
to note that immigrants enjoy full coverage of health services and other forms of social 
security; that the local municipalities provide high quality and heavily subsidized child care 
for virtually all children between 1-6 years of age; and that comprehensive schools are 
ensured resources according to need, following governmental norms. The latter means that, 
for example, a greater share of immigrant pupils adds resources in order to compensate for 
difficulties in instruction, stemming from language problems in particular (more resources are 
also given to schools for pupils with other special needs). In our data, this is reflected in the 
                                                 
6  As the measures normally reported on segregation, primarily the index of dissimilarity, are not 
margin-insensitive, there is unfortunately no straightforward way of comparing segregation between 
countries (this point has been made several times over the last decades: succinct formulations are 
found in, e.g., Falk, Cortese and Cohen 1978; Grusky and Charles 1998). It is generally believed, 
however, that European figures in general do not match the strong spatial segregation of the black 
population in large American city areas (see the review by Alba and Nee 2003, pp. 248-60; Musterd 
2005). fact that only five per cent of the individual-level variation in school grades were due to 
differences between schools in 1998/99.
7  
To be sure, there are sharp socioeconomic differences between immigrants and 
Swedish-born, reflected in employment rates (Ekberg 1999), unemployment risks (Arai and 
Vilhelmsson 2004), and in the receipt of social welfare support (Franzén 2003). Nonetheless, 
disadvantaged immigrant children in Sweden face more equal opportunities than they do in 
most other countries due to lower inequality overall. This is reflected, for the population as a 
whole, in extremely low child poverty rates (Bradbury and Jäntti 2001), relatively low 
intergenerational inequality in terms of educational and occupational inheritance (Breen and 
Jonsson 2005), and relatively high income mobility across generations (Solon 2002; 
Björklund et al 2002).  
Arguably, then, Sweden is an interesting case to study because it combines 
comparatively high immigration rates and ethnic segregation with relatively equal 
opportunities for children. Therefore, we would expect that our estimates of ethnic 
segregation effects on educational outcomes are lower bound. 
                                                 
7 Though comparisons between countries should be done with some caution, it appears that the figures 
for Sweden are somewhat lower than in England and the Netherlands, while between-school variation 
seems to be larger in the U.S.A. (Scheerens and Bosker 1997, Ch. 3). For example, Roscigno (1998) 
reports that 18%-22% of the variance in reading achievement among tenth-graders in U.S. public 
schools was between schools in 1990. It may appear futile to study between-school variation when it is 
as low as in Sweden, but even modest between-school variation may conceal relatively strong school-
level effects (cf. Duncan and Raudenbush 1999). DATA AND VARIABLES 
The data-set on which the empirical analyses in this paper are based include information on 
all pupils (about 193,000 individuals) who attended the ninth grade in all Swedish 
comprehensive schools in 1998 and 1999 (1,249 schools). The information on individual 
pupils come from an official school registry of nine-graders (Åk9-registret), including 
information on which school they attended. This data-set was matched (using unique personal 
identification numbers) with registry data on parents, mainly from the 1980 and 1990 
Censuses.
8 Thus, data on pupils’ achievements are combined with information about basic 
characteristics of their families.  
The allocation of pupils to Swedish comprehensive schools is based on which 
residential area the pupil lives in. There are some exceptions to that, such as some private 
schools, but only around two per cent of pupils in our cohorts actually go to such schools.
9 
We excluded private schools and very small schools in which the total number of ninth grade 
students in the years studied was less than 20. The reason is partly that the vast majority of 
                                                 
8 Such matching procedures are standard in Sweden, carried out by Statistics Sweden, and are entirely 
accurate. It should be noted that for immigrants arriving in Sweden after 1990, the matching relies on 
information from the annual registry of the population (RTB) and the Flergenerationsregister, to 
which individual-level information of parental characteristics have been added. We have no 
information on parents’ occupation for this sub-group.  
9 There is also a voucher system making it possible for pupils to switch schools from their 
“residential” one. In our cohorts, this was not so commonly used, and studies in Stockholm conclude 
that it does not lead to ethnic segregation – most of those who use the system in fact move to a school 
that is more conveniently located (often, it is closer, which must be seen in relation to the rather high 
density of schools in the inner city of Stockholm), and not one that differs in the composition of pupils 
or general standard (Kjellman 2001). students attend ‘normal’ public schools, partly that the choice of other types of school is 
dictated by some unmeasured characteristic of families that may also be correlated with grade 
point averages. Among private and smaller schools, there are relatively more schools for 
children with special needs, and religious/ethnic schools with restricted intake and special 
curricula meaning that these schools have a pupil composition that sharply differs from 
ordinary public schools. The exclusion of private and small schools reduces the number of 
students to about 188,000 and the number of schools to 1,043. 
Outcome variables 
Our outcome variable is pupil’s school marks (grades) in the 9
th and final grade of 
comprehensive school, defined as the standardized (mean=0, SD=1) sum of the school grades 
in the 16 best subjects for each individual pupil (meritvärde). Almost all Swedish children 
pass through the public comprehensive school between 7-16 years of age. There is little 
streaming or tracking and grades are only required in the 9
th grade (age 16), which are the 
ones we have information on. In each of 16 subjects, one out of four grade levels are assigned 
by teachers: not pass, pass, pass with distinction, and pass with great distinction (these are 
then given 0, 10, 15, and 20 points, respectively). These grades shall, according to the national 
regulation, measure pupils’ knowledge as evaluated against pre-determined goals in a national 
curriculum. Grades no doubt mostly reflect results in recurrent, informal examinations (which 
are subject-based rather than general ability tests). As teachers are encouraged to “use all 
kinds of information” to assess pupils’ knowledge, also class-room performance and the 
results of assignments are considered. In addition, as each school must carry out common 
national tests in core subjects (mainly Swedish, Maths and English) teachers use such test 
results for evaluating individual pupils. The National Board of Education, in inspecting 
schools, can also control that school grade averages do not get out of line with the results at 
these national tests. The sum of the teacher-assigned grades is consequential for pupils’ array of available 
school choices at (upper) secondary school (age 17-19); in particular, only pupils who pass a 
grade limit, defined as having a “pass” in Swedish, English, and Maths, are eligible for 
making the transition to the academic study programs. We have also made analyses on 
eligibility, so defined, but as the results are similar to the ones we find on the basis of our 
analysis on grades, they are not reported here but available from the authors upon request. 
Level 1: The pupils and their parents 
We have information on a number of relevant pupil and parental, or household, characteristics 
(see Table 1a). Sibship size is defined as the number of siblings (whether biological or not) 
living in the respondents’ household. Four family types are distinguished: intact families (i.e., 
children living with two biological or adoptive parents), reconstituted families (one 
biological/adoptive parent and one step-parent), single parent-families, and children living 
without a parent (in special homes or with other adults). Two out of three pupils live in 
nuclear families and about one out of four lives with a single parent (mostly with the mother). 
Furthermore, we have data on the biological (or adoptive) parents’ level of education, country 
of birth, unemployment experience, and experience of receiving social welfare during the year 
when the pupil left compulsory school, i.e., 1998 or 1999. The parents’ level of education is 
based on the highest out of seven levels of education achieved, according to a Swedish 
standard classification (Statistics Sweden 1988). Social welfare is a dummy variable coded as 
1 if at least one of the parents obtained social welfare during the relevant year, which was the 
case for eleven per cent of the pupils in our data. As this benefit is given on a household basis, 
the variable indicates household poverty. The parents’ experience of unemployment is a dummy variable coded as 1 if at least one of the parents obtained unemployment benefits 
during the relevant year, which is the case for around 23 per cent of the pupils.
10  
Table 1a here 
Pupils’ immigrant status is measured by two binary variables. The first variable is 
given the value 1 if the pupil and both his/her parents were born abroad, and zero otherwise; it 
thus distinguishes (first generation) immigrants.
11 The second variable is given the value 1 if 
the pupil was born in Sweden but both his/her parents were born abroad (second generation 
immigrants).
12 If either equals 1, we identify the group as ‘pupils of immigrant background’.  
In the empirical analyses sex, unemployment, social welfare, and sibship size are 
centered around their grand means. For parents’ education we use the most frequent category, 
short secondary education, as reference category. For immigrant status, Swedish-born 
students with Swedish-born parents are the reference group. 
                                                 
10 This is a high figure compared to the average unemployment rate which was around ten per cent at 
that time (it is currently, in 2005, around five per cent). The reasons are partly that most children have 
two parents and thus an elevated probability that at least one of them has experienced unemployment, 
and probably partly that it was common with shorter spells of unemployment. 
11 We define adopted children who were born abroad as born in Sweden. They normally arrive in 
Sweden at a very young age. 
12 Previous research has shown that having one Swedish-born parent and one foreign-born has the 
same impact on school results as having two Swedish-born parents: the real divide is between those 
who do not have any Swedish-born parent (and thus not Swedish as the mother tongue) and the rest 
(Similä 1994). Level 2: Schools in 1998 and 1999 
Descriptive statistics on our school-level variables are shown in Table 1b. Our crucial 
independent variable is the proportion immigrant pupils in a school in 1998 and 1999, what 
we will term ethnic density or ethnic concentration. This measure has the advantage of being 
simple both to compute and understand, and is also policy relevant. In a discussion of 
different measures of segregation, Reardon and Firebough (2002) recommend such a simple 
measure when studying schools, as it is reasonable to assume that all pupils within a school 
occupy the same location in the social geography of schools. The possible exception that they 
mention is that it is less likely that pupils of very different ages influence each other: to 
circumvent this, we base our measure only on the immigrant status of ninth-graders.
13 
We compute three different compositional variables to measure ethnic density: the 
proportion of first generation immigrants in a school; the proportion of second generation 
immigrants; the sum of these proportions (‘immigrant background’) (Table 1b). There is a 
great deal of variation between schools in pupils’ results as well as in their social background. 
The maximum share of first generation immigrants in a school is 87 per cent and 62 per cent 
of second generation immigrants. In 74 (out of 1,043) schools, there are no pupils with 
immigrant background. In one school, all pupils have such background. The distribution of 
native and immigrant pupils across schools are depicted in Figures 1 and 2, where it can be 
seen that few native students (around 15 per cent) go to schools with more than 20 per cent 
immigrants, while a majority of immigrant children are found in such schools. The Index of 
                                                 
13 More elaborated measures, such as the ‘generalized heterogeneity measure’ used by Moody (2001), 
could be calculated from the proportion immigrants of different origins, but as we do not set out to test 
hypotheses about immigrant heterogeneity in the school population, we prefer our more interpretable 
measure of ethnic density. Dissimilarity shows that 44 per cent of first generation immigrants would need to change 
schools to achieve an even distribution of cases across schools. 
Figures 1 and 2 here 
We use two measures of the socioeconomic composition of schools: the proportion of 
students with at least one parent with university degree and the proportion of students with at 
least one parent receiving social welfare during the relevant year.
14 Table 1b shows that there 
are some schools in which seven out of ten pupils have at least one parent with university 
degree. There is also one school in which only one out of hundred pupils has such educational 
background. Also the proportion of pupils whose household has experienced social welfare 
varies strongly between schools. The lowest average grades in a school are 121 points and the 
highest is 253 points. In sum, these descriptive statistics clearly show that ethnic and 
socioeconomic segregation in Swedish schools is a reality. The zero-order correlations 
between the level-two variables are given in Table A2 in Appendix. There is a strong negative 
correlation between the proportion of children with no Swedish-born parent and the average 
results in the school, which is more marked for the first- than for the second-generation 
immigrants. The ethnic density variables are also strongly and positively correlated with the 
proportion of pupils living in a household who received social welfare the current year.  
Table 1b here 
                                                 
14 We also checked with proportion unemployed, which did not change any conclusion. MODELS AND ANALYTICAL STRATEGY 
The data set includes information both on individual pupils and on the composition of the 
schools they attended. An appropriate statistical method for dealing with information of this 
kind, with individuals nested within schools, is hierarchical or multilevel modeling (Bryk and 
Raudenbush 1992). Multilevel models estimate within-school and between-school equations, 
accounting for potential dependence between observations within schools. A particular 
advantage in our case is that it allows us to estimate both random intercepts (which addresses 
our question whether ethnic density in schools affects grades) and random slopes (whether the 
‘individual-level effect of being immigrant’ varies with ethnic density of schools). One way 
of looking at this hierarchical linear model (HLM, we use version 5), is to conceive of each 
school as having its “own” level-one regression equation with an intercept and a slope (or 
slopes) that in turn constitute the outcome(s) in the level-two models (Raudenbush et al. 
2000). However, the estimation is done in one stage and uses both within- and between-group 
variance to estimate effects. While the standard HLM model makes the strong assumption that 
slopes are uncorrelated with residuals at the school level, we will profit from a model 
specification that can handle such omitted variable bias. 
Level-one, within-school equation: 
Gradeij = B0j + B1j*FIRSTij + B2j*SECONDij + Bk*￿ BACKGROUNDij + Rij  (1) 
The level-one, or within-school, equation estimates the grades for each pupil i within 
each school j. B0j is the intercept (or average grade) for school j. B1j represents the gap in 
grades between first generation immigrants and children with Swedish-born parents for school 
j and B2j does the same for second generation immigrants. Thus, both the intercept and the 
estimate of the grade gap between the groups are allowed to vary between schools. We also 
include in the level-one model a vector of the individual pupils’ background characteristics. 
Bk are fixed parameters for these background characteristics. Rij is the level-one random variance, or each individual’s unique contribution to the outcome. The random variance is 
assumed to be normally distributed.  
Level-two, between-school equations: 
B0j = G00 + G01*%FIRST + G02*%SECOND + G03*%WELFARE + G04*%DEGREE + U0j (2) 
The first level-two, or between-school equation, estimates the variation in average 
school grade levels (B0j). G00 is the intercept; G01 is the regression coefficient for the 
proportion of first generation immigrant children in the school on average grades in school; 
G02 is the corresponding regression coefficient for the proportion of second-generation 
immigrants; G03 is the coefficient for the proportion of children with parents receiving social 
welfare; G04 is the coefficient for the proportion of children with academic background. U0j is 
the random variation in school results between schools.  
Equation 2 (sometimes called a random intercept model) addresses the question to 
what extent a school’s average grades are a function of characteristics of its pupils, but 
implicitly assumes that slopes do not vary across schools. However, we also want to address 
the question whether pupils of immigrant origin are most affected by ethnic density in their 
schools – i.e, we want to fit a cross-level interaction. In Equation 3 (a random slope model), 
the gap in grades between first-generation immigrants and the reference group of pupils with 
at least one Swedish-born parent (B1j) is the outcome. G10 is the fictitious average gap in 
grades between the reference group and first generation Swedish pupils in schools with no 
such pupils, G11 is the regression coefficient for the effect of the proportion of first generation 
pupils on the gap in grades, and U1j is the random variation between schools in grade gaps. 
Equation 4 shows the same for the gap between second-generation immigrants and the 
reference group (B2j).  
B1j = G10 + G11* %FIRST + U1j         (3) 
B2j = G20 + G21* %SECOND + U2j         (4) Identifying effects of ethnic segregation 
The problem of endogeneity, or population sorting, plagues studies of the influence of social 
environment (neighborhoods, schools) on individual outcomes (see Manski 2000 for a general 
discussion; Hanushek et al. 2003 applied to school effects; Dietz 2002 to neighborhood 
effects). Normally, it is assumed that endogeneity causes an upward bias in estimates of 
environmental effects, because unobserved (omitted) variables on the basis of which families 
sort themselves to residential areas – such as economic resources or parental aspirations – are 
related to children’s school success. In addition, identifying ethnic segregation effects at 
school level is difficult because other school characteristics that are related to ethnic 
segregation – such as the schools’ economic resources – are correlated with school 
achievement.  
We deal with omitted variable bias in various ways. First, as described above, we 
control for a set of empirically crucial and well measured variables indicating individual 
pupils’ background as well as the socioeconomic composition of schools. Second, we believe 
that the problem of bias in the interaction between the proportion of immigrants in the school 
and the dummy variable indicating the individual student’s immigrant status (Model 3 and 4) 
in a model that includes the main effects of schools is relatively small.
15 Third, we use pupils’ 
residential mobility history to control for population sorting. This addresses the argument of 
                                                 
15 Hanushek et al (2002) argue precisely that, in their case, the fact that the negative effect of racial 
composition vary across minority groups suggests that differences in school quality are not responsible 
for their results. This is a plausible interpretation, though certainly not water-proof: it is, for example, 
quite possible that poor school quality affects those with less human capital and other resources in 
their family of origin most. population sorting head on, and provides an important – and almost unique – opportunity of 
dealing with omitted variable bias using observables.
16 
Finally, we address the problem of unobserved school heterogeneity by applying what 
is generally (particularly within econometrics) known as a school-fixed effects model. This is 
done within the HLM framework by group-mean centering individual-level variables, i.e., 
expressing them as deviations from the school means. As all between-school variation is thus 
removed, this model cannot estimate the main effect of immigrant density or any other school 
attribute that is invariant between pupils within a school. But this model represents a powerful 
test of hypotheses 3 and 4 because the interaction effects between ethnic density and 
individual immigrant status are not biased due to omitted school level characteristics.
17 
                                                 
16 Besides controlling for observables, there are three ways that researchers have tried to come to grip 
with problems of population grouping. One is using instrumental variables (e.g., Evans, Oates and 
Schwab 1992), re-estimating school-level variables via a measured variable that is strongly related to 
these but unrelated to the error term. The problem of finding such an instrument is however 
formidable and a common critique of this strategy (e.g., Duncan and Raudenbush 1999; Rivkin 2001). 
Secondly, researchers have used a combination of individual and school-fixed effect models 
(Hanushek et al 2002; 2003), which however put a lot of demand on data quite aside from 
interpretative problems. A third strategy is to use experiments and quasi-experiments (e.g. the 
Tennessee-experiment, residential relocation experiments, such as MTO [see Durlauf 2004 for a 
critical review], and local quasi-experiments such as Winston and Zimmerman 2004). These studies 
are important but likely to be exceptions. Experiments also have limitations: for ethical reasons it is 
not possible to change a situation ‘for the worse’, so the consequences of the most common change – 
increasing ethnic concentration – could hardly be studied that way. 
17 As this model does not use between-group variation, there is no particular advantage in estimating it 
in HLM. We estimated a fixed-effect model in Stata using dummy variables for schools and received 
very similar results.  It should be noted that the attempt to reduce upward omitted variable bias by using 
control variables or fixed effect models may under some circumstances introduce a downward 
bias in estimates. This is because the control variables are endogenous to the extent that ethnic 
segregation impact on our indicators of parents’ and households’ resources (cf. Duncan, 
Connell and Klebanov 1997; Sampson et al. 2002). For example, if residential segregation 
means that immigrants have less opportunities of getting a job and avoiding poverty (by 
mechanisms outlined by Wilson 1987, for example), then controlling for (parental and school-
level) social welfare and unemployment will lead to an underestimation of the influence of 
ethnic segregation. It is also likely that our school-fixed-effect model partials out differences 
between schools that are consequences of ethnic segregation (e.g., if the most qualified 
teachers avoid certain schools where there is a high concentration of immigrant pupils). 
Estimates of segregation effects from models where these controls are applied will thus be 
conservative and counterbalance the assumed upward bias introduced by population sorting.  
RESULTS 
Average grades 
Table 2 gives results from four hierarchical linear models, estimating the effects of ethnic 
concentration in school on average grades. Model 1 shows that the ethnic gap in grades is 
twice as wide for first-generation immigrant pupils than for the second generation (0.39 of a 
standard deviation as compared to 0.19).
18 Model 2, in which ethnic concentration is 
introduced as a predictor, reveals that grades are 0.54 standardized points lower in schools in 
                                                 
18 We also fitted models with a more detailed classification of immigrant origin (into Nordic, European 
and Western, and non-European/Western regions). This showed, as expected, that the latter group fare 
worse in terms of grades. However, using the detailed classification did not change the estimates of the 
school-level variables, which is why we choose to present the simpler models. which all pupils are immigrants than in schools with none. The corresponding figure for the 
proportion of second-generation immigrants is -0.37.
19 
Table 2 about here 
In model 3, we analyze whether the effects of ethnic density on average school grades 
are due to the selection of pupils from poor social conditions to those schools that pupils with 
immigrant background attend. We do that by adding individuals’ social background (level-
one) and schools’ social composition (level-two). The effects of these variables are in line 
with results from previous research. Having parents with low qualifications, who are 
unemployed, or on social welfare, are characteristics that all are associated with lower grades; 
men and those with many siblings have lower grades too. Also when these variables are 
accounted for, grades are higher in schools where more pupils have well-educated parents. 
This indicates that school results are not only influenced by the pupil’s socioeconomic origin, 
but also by that of his/her schoolmates. The result that this ‘positive’ context appears to be 
more important than the ‘negative’ one, indicated by social benefits, is in line with previous 
studies and supports the general idea of peer effects and positive externalities of parental 
educational resources (cf. Brooks-Gunn et al. 1997).
 20  
                                                 
19 It should be noted that we calculate out of the range of the data. There is no school in which all 
pupils in the ninth grade are first- or second-generation immigrants. 
20 We addressed the possibility that our results in Model 3 are biased due to the multicollinearity of the 
school-level variables proportion social welfare and proportion immigrants, by running separate 
models excluding one of these variables at a time. The only important change in the results was that 
the proportion social welfare turned out to have a strongly negative effect on grades (-0.41) when the What is of crucial interest is that when comparing Model 2 with Model 3, it turns out 
that variables included in the latter model account for the whole individual-level gap in grades 
between second-generation immigrants and pupils with Swedish-born parents (a result 
consistent with Dryler 2001). They also account for the entire effect of the density of second-
generation immigrant pupils on average grades in schools. For those who immigrated 
themselves the results are different. First, the ethnic gap in grades, though strongly reduced, is 
still significant after controls. Second, the main effect on grades of the proportion of 
immigrant pupils, while somewhat reduced, is still relatively strong under this model 
specification (-0.41 standardized points).
21 
Next, we ask whether the grade disadvantage associated with high ethnic density in 
schools is particularly marked for immigrant students. This is tested in Model 4 where we add 
interaction terms between ethnic gaps in grades and ethnic density in schools. For pupils born 
outside Sweden the interaction term is negative and significant, indicating that the ethnic gap 
in school results increases with the density of immigrant pupils in school. While pupils in 
general show lower grades in schools with many immigrants, this is then all the more 
pronounced for immigrant pupils themselves. For second-generation immigrants the 
corresponding interaction term is positive but not significant at conventional levels. Grades 
                                                                                                                                                          
proportion immigrants (first and second generation) was removed from the analysis. The effects of 
proportion immigrants remained more or less the same when proportion social welfare was removed. 
21 In an additional analysis we fitted Model 3 for only those students who live in nuclear families 
(results not shown). The reason for this is that the influence of both parents’ resources on children’s 
school progress may be less important when one of the parents does not live together with the child. 
Moreover, we fitted Model 3 separately for ninth graders in 1998 and 1999 because the social 
composition of ninth graders in the previous year may be less important for the results pertaining to 
those studying one year later. The results of these additional analyses confirm our conclusions.  for these pupils are rather similar to those of pupils with Swedish-born parents (given 
individuals’ social background and the composition of the schools they attend), irrespective of 
the proportion of second-generation immigrant pupils in schools.  
The results in Table 2 suggests that there is an effect of ethnic density on school 
results. However, we have so far assumed linear effects and as explained it is plausible that 
there is some threshold value where it emerges. We address this question by replacing the 
metric measure of proportion of pupils born outside Sweden (using Model 3 of Table 2 as our 
point of departure) with dummy variables. The result, displayed in Table 3, does indeed 
suggest that there is a threshold: The effect of ethnic density on grades is weak in schools with 
less than 40 per cent children born outside Sweden but beyond that point there is a fairly 
strong negative marginal effect. This rather extreme form of segregation applies to 24 schools 
or two per cent of all schools in our data, and very few pupils with Swedish-born parents go to 
such schools (cf. Figure 2). However, it is not such an uncommon experience for immigrant 
pupils: around fourteen per cent of all pupils born outside Sweden attend such segregated 
schools.  
Table 3 about here 
Testing for robustness of the results 
We address the issue of omitted variable bias by performing two additional analyses. First, a 
common problem with model specifications such as ours is that parents who have high 
educational aspirations for their children and who are able and willing to support them, move 
out from disadvantaged areas (and vice versa). One straightforward way of addressing this 
problem of population sorting is to control for the moves themselves. We managed to match onto our data information on individuals’ residential moves between local areas
22 and we then 
constructed a variable measuring the difference in ethnic density between the residential area 
before and after the relocation.
23 We used the proportion of first generation immigrants, 
because our previous results show these to be most important, and because we believe that 
this is a characteristic of residential areas that is also sensed by families when they make 
choices where to live. If a respondent has experienced several moves, we took the difference 
between the first, origin, location and the current parish of destination (as selection of 
residential areas often is made in steps, as in a housing-career model). The difference, which 
is negative if someone moved to an area with less immigrant concentration and positive 
                                                 
22 The information is coded according to parishes, which are relatively small and often homogeneous 
residential areas though more heterogeneous than schools and larger than the typical neighborhood 
(the average number of people in a parish is 3,300 which is smaller than the average U.S. census tract, 
for example). The data contain information on when the move occurred, the origin parish, and the 
destination parish. No move is registered before the birth of the respondent (understandably but 
regrettably), so we cannot take into account population sorting that occurred before that month for 
native-born. For immigrants, the first information is on the parish of their first residential location in 
Sweden. Moves then comprise the historical period 1982/83 to 1998/99 for native born (age 0 to 16) 
and for immigrant pupils the (variable) year of immigration and 1998/99 (immigration age to 16). 
23 The proportion of immigrants in a parish was calculated using the 1990 Census. It would have been 
even more attractive to have this figure for the year when the move took place, as parishes may change 
their relative proportion of immigrants, but this was not possible. Taking 1990 as the source year is 
however a good compromise as the respondents were born 1982/83 and their grades stem from 
1998/99. otherwise, is entered as an individual-level covariate in our model.
24 In addition, we include 
the proportion of immigrants in the parish of origin (i.e., the parish of birth or, for immigrants, 
the one upon arrival); and we also use a variable measuring how many moves a pupil has 
made during childhood (within Sweden), as relocation has been shown to have a negative 
effect on children’s educational attainment (Astone and McLanahan 1994). Descriptive 
statistics on these three residential mobility variables are shown at the bottom of Table 1a. 
Table 4 shows the results of adding them to two models of grades. For ease of presentation, 
we leave out the individual-level control variables in the table, reporting only the effects of 
ethnic concentration and sorting. Model 1 shows the estimates before controlling for sorting 
(i.e., they replicate the effects from Table 2, Model 3). 
Table 4 here 
Table 4 reveals only relatively minor changes in the parameters of interest. As expected, the 
proportion of immigrants in the residential area of origin has a negative impact on grades, as 
has the number of times a child has moved. The sorting variable has an unexpected positive 
sign but is not significant at the 5%-level. One reason that this variable is not more important 
is that most residential moves are within the same parish or between parishes of rather similar 
ethnic concentration (cf. Table 1a). The average positive effect turns out to be a function of a 
more complex underlying pattern where the assumptions of population sorting is borne out for 
                                                 
24 This follows from our expectation that the variables proxy for different resources and aspirations 
among families, though particularly the proportion immigrants at the parish of birth may also have an 
influence via social interaction.  immigrants, but not for those with Swedish-born parents.
25 We tried different model 
specifications to account for these types of interaction effects, but none changed the 
parameters of greatest interest to us, namely those representing the effect of ethnic density in 
schools on grades. Our conclusion is that our results are robust to population sorting that takes 
place via domestic residential moves during childhood.  
Next, we address the potential problem that the ethnic segregation effect is partly an 
effect of differences in school quality between areas with more and less immigrants. We 
replicate the analysis of school grades without school-level variables and with individual-level 
variables school-mean centered. By doing this, we control for all characteristics of the school 
and of the pupils that do not vary across pupils within the school (such as unmeasured school 
resources, teacher quality etc.). Naturally, this means that we cannot estimate the main effect 
of immigrant density or any other school-level variable. However, we are able to estimate the 
interaction effects between ethnic density and individual immigrant status. This (school-fixed-
effects) model, presented in Table 5, gives further support to our previous results, as reported 
in Table 2, Model 4. The interaction effects are somewhat weaker in the fixed-effects model (-
0.21 as compared to -0.24), but the conclusions are the same. The grades of second-generation 
immigrants (relative to pupils of Swedish descent) do not seem to be influenced by their 
concentration to certain schools, while first generation immigrants lose more than those of 
native origin by attending schools with a high concentration of immigrant pupils. The latter 
                                                 
25 It is possible that population sorting that occurred before the birth of those with Swedish-born 
parents can explain the difference between movers and stayers. We would ourselves put more weight 
on the results for immigrants because we capture population sorting more accurately for them. This is 
the case particularly as immigrants did not choose their initial residential area during most of the years 
we cover (1984-1994); instead, they were allocated to one by the immigration authorities, a process 
that approaches random assignment (Edin, Fredriksson, and Åslund 2003).  effect, it should be noted, is fairly weak: going from a school with few immigrants to one of 
the most segregated schools would, according to our model, make immigrant pupils lag a 
tenth of a standard deviation more behind their fellow pupils of Swedish origin. 
Table 5 here 
All in all, our analyses in this section support the main results we attained above. We 
cannot, on the basis of these tests, rule out that our estimates of the effect of ethnic 
concentration on school results are biased because of omitted variables, but it would seem 
rather unlikely. At any rate, until further data become available to researchers, our results 
provide, to our knowledge, the best estimates for the effects of ethnic concentration in schools 
on educational achievement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In Sweden, like in many Western countries, recent large-scale immigration in combination 
with substantial ethnic spatial segregation have raised concerns about the opportunities of 
children in minority areas. We ask whether the proportion immigrants in a school affects 
pupils’ grades, using a unique data-set, comprising 188,000 16-year old pupils from 1,043 
comprehensive schools graduating from the ninth grade in 1998 and 1999.  
Multilevel analyses suggest that ethnic density in schools has a negative effect on 
grades which is not confined to, but most preponderant for immigrant pupils. We find a 
threshold effect indicating that ethnic densities up to 40 per cent have little impact on grades, 
while attending a school with higher concentration of immigrant pupils is connected with 
around a fifth of a standard deviation’s reduction in grades. This is a moderately strong effect 
which concerns rather few schools but nevertheless affects fourteen per cent of immigrant 
children.  Our data offer unusually good opportunities of testing how robust our results are. To 
account for population sorting, we use longitudinal information on pupils’ residential moves 
from their birth, and to account for unobserved school heterogeneity we apply a school-fixed-
effects model. These tests do not change the estimates much, suggesting that omitted variables 
do not bias our estimates (and there is a risk that we underestimate the segregation effect by 
controlling for some potentially endogenous variables). Thus, we concur with the few other 
studies that have addressed the issue of bias in estimates of ethnic/race composition of schools 
(especially Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Hanushek et al 2002; Hoxby 2000), that such context 
does matter for pupil outcomes. 
What are the policy implications of our findings? Our interpretation of the results is 
that there is both a general cost of ethnic segregation in terms of lower average achievement 
as well as a specific cost for immigrant children. Especially interesting from a policy point of 
view is that ethnic concentration appears to have noteworthy negative effects only at 
relatively high levels of segregation. This suggests that desegregation policies would lead 
both to more efficient schools and to less educational inequality; and that counter-acting the 
most extreme forms of segregation would probably be enough to see positive results. 
Although segregation is of importance, a large proportion of the variation in school 
achievement remains between individuals within schools, not between schools: If we want to 
raise overall standards and reduce inequality between children of immigrant and native origin 
in school grades, policies for increasing immigrant parents’ human capital and improving 
their economic and labor market situation may have more potential than combating 
segregation. 
Can our results on ethnic segregation in Sweden be comfortably exported to the 
U.S.A. and other nations? The generality of the presumed processes behind ethnic segregation 
effects – such as ethnic disadvantage and immigrant language problems in combination with collective socialization and peer influence – suggests that this is the case. Also, the size of the 
immigrant population, the trends in immigration, as well as the substantial ethnic segregation 
in Sweden appear to be comparable to the U.S.A. and several other Western countries. 
However, Swedish welfare state policies counteract minority group poverty, and much 
governmental and municipality funds are invested in minority areas to keep them in good 
shape and their schools and social institutions on par with those in other areas. Thus, we 
would expect that ethnic segregation estimates from Swedish data provide something of a 
lower boundary. We can then speculate that ethnic segregation effects on school results may 
be of quite substantial magnitude without financial and other support to ethnic minorities and 
neighborhoods where they are concentrated, and that residential segregation is likely to harm 
human capital development in many Western countries. 
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Figure 1. The proportion of immigrant pupils (having no Swedish-born parent) found in 
schools with different immigrant densities. 
 
 
Figure 2. The proportion of “native” pupils (Swedish-born with Swedish-born parents) found 
in schools with different immigrant densities. 
 TABLE 1a: Descriptive Statistics for Individual-level Variables.  
 
  Mean  Std . d ev .  Min.  Max.  N 
Ind iv id ual-lev el v ariables:           
Grades  199.369  60.17  0  320  188,724 
Standardized grades  0.0  1.0  -3.3  2.0   
Immigrant background  0.125  0.33  0  1  188,617 
  First generation  0.078  0.27  0  1  188,617 
  Second generation  0.046  0.21  0  1  188,617 
Women  0.486  0.50  0  1  188,724 
Sibship size  2.087  1.44  0  17  188,724 
Experience of unemployment  0.230  0.42  0  1  188,283 
Experience of social welfare  0.110  0.31  0  1  188,278 
Parents’  Short compulsory  0.030  0.17  0  1  187,743 
Ed ucation  Compulsory  0.084  0.28  0  1   
  Short secondary  0.333  0.47  0  1   
  Secondary  0.137  0.34  0  1   
  Lower tertiary  0.193  0.39  0  1   
  University degree  0.208  0.41  0  1   
  Postgraduate  0.016  0.13  0  1   
Fam ily   Intact family  0.661  0.47  0  1  188,724 
Ty pe  Reconstituted family  0.072  0.26  0  1   
  Single parent  0.251  0.43  0  1   
  Alone, institution or  
  other adults 
0.016  0.12  0  1   
Proportion immigrants at place of 
birth or arrival in Sweden 
0.028  0.034  0  0.224  189,510 
Difference current-origin residence  -0.003  0.030  -0.224  0.224  188,743 
Number of residential moves  1.991  2.266  0  33  188,743 
  
TABLE 1b: Descriptive Statistics for School-level Variables.  
 
  Mean  Std . d ev .  Min.  Max.  N 
School-lev el v ariables:           
Proportion First generation immigrants  0.075  0.10  0  0.87  1,043 
   Second generation immigrants  0.045  0.07  0  0.62  1,043 
  Immigrant background (1
st+2
nd)  0.120  0.15  0  1  1,043 
   Parents university degree  0.209  0.12  0.01  0.79  1,043 
  Parents on social welfare  0.110  0.08  0.00  0.79  1,043 
Average   Grade of the school  198.88  15.03  121.26  253.41  1,043 
   Standardized grade  -0.01  0.25  -1.30  0.90  1,043 
   Proportion qualified  0.907  0.07  0.48  1  1,043 
 
  TABLE 2. Random Coefficient Models of School Grades: The Impact of Ethnic Density (Proportion 
First- and Second Generation Separately). Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses.  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
SCHOOL LEVEL         
Intercept  0.03** (.007)  0.09** (.009)  -0.14** (.036)  -0.14** (.016) 
Proportion first generation     -0.54** (.116)  -0.41** (.155)  -0.38*  (.158) 
Proportion first generation * Ethnic gap 1        -0.24*  (.118) 
Proportion second generation     -0.37*  (.169)  -0.14   (.138)  -0.16   (.139) 
Proportion second generation  * Ethnic gap 2        0.13   (.122) 
Proportion university degree      0.19** (.044)  0.19** (.044) 
Proportion social welfare      0.06   (.162)  0.06   (.163) 
LEVEL-1 FIXED COEFFICIENTS         
Ethnic gap 1: First generation vs. Swedish origin  -0.39** (.015)  -0.38** (.015)  -0.12** (.015)  -0.09** (.019) 
Ethnic gap 2: Second generation vs. Swedish origin  -0.19** (.014)  -0.17** (.015)  0.01   (.013)  -0.01   (.017) 
Sex (female)      0.37** (.006)  0.37** (.006) 
Sibship size      -0.05** (.002)  -0.05** (.002)  
Experience of unemployment      -0.08** (.005)  -0.08** (.005) 
Experience of social welfare      -0.39** (.011)  -0.39** (.011) 
Parents’  Short compulsory      -0.13** (.016)  -0.13** (.016) 
Ed ucation  Compulsory      -0.17** (.008)  -0.17** (.008) 
  Short secondary      Ref.  Ref. 
  Secondary      0.24** (.006)  0.24** (.006) 
  Lower tertiary      0.41** (.006)  0.41** (.006) 
  University degree      0.65** (.006)  0.65** (.006) 
  Postgraduate      0.89** (.015)  0.89** (.015) 
Fam ily   Intact family      Ref.  Ref. 
ty pe  Reconstituted family      -0.24** (.009)  -0.24** (.009) 
  Single parent      -0.28** (.006)  -0.28** (.006) 
  Alone, institution or other adults      -0.59** (.025)  -0.59** (.025) 
RANDOM EFFECTS         
Variance in intercepts U0j  0.044  0.040  0.021  0.021 
Variance in ethnic gap 1 U1j  0.103  0.103  0.087  0.087 
Variance in ethnic gap 2 U2j  0.040  0.040  0.030  0.030 
Individual level variance Rij  0.928  0.928  0.740  0.740 
Number of individuals  188,724  188,724  188,724  188,724 
Number of schools  1,043  1,043  1,043  1,043 
Note: ** = significant at the 1%-level; * = at the 5%-level. TABLE 3. Random Coefficient Models of School Grades: The Impact of Ethnic Density 
(Density Variable for First Generation Immigrants Transformed to a Series of Dummy 
Variables). Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
 
SCHOOL LEVEL  b-coefficient  Standard error 
Intercept  -0.149
**   (0.017) 
Proportion first   0%-10%  Ref.   
Generation  11%-20%  -0.078
**   (0.017) 
Immigrants  21%-30%  -0.067   (0.036) 
  31%-40%  -0.057   (0.062) 
  41%-50%  -0.231
*   (0.118) 
  51% or higher  -0.241
*   (0.117) 
Proportion university degree    0.183
**   (0.043) 
Proportion social welfare    -0.014   (0.145) 
LEVEL-1 FIXED COEFFICIENTS 
Same as in Table 2a, Model 3 
   
Ethnic gap 1:   First generation vs. 
Swedish origin 
-0.123
**   (0.014) 
Ethnic gap 2:   Second generation vs. 
Swedish origin 
0.007  0.013 
RANDOM EFFECTS   
Variance in intercepts U0j  0.021 
Variance in ethnic gap 1 U1j  0.087 
Variance in ethnic gap 2 U2j  0.029 
Individual level variance Rij  0.740 
Number of individuals  188,724 
Number of schools  1,043 
Note: ** = significant at the 1%-level; * = at the 5%-level. 
  
 TABLE 4. Random Coefficient Models of School Grades, Controlling for Ethnic Density at the 
Place of Residence (Parish) at Birth, or Arrival in Sweden, and for Residential Mobility. Robust 
Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
  School grades 
  Model 1  Model 2 
SCHOOL LEVEL     
Intercept  -0.14** (.036)  -0.01** (.017) 
Proportion first generation   -0.41** (.155)  -0.40** (.153) 
Proportion second generation   -0.14   (.138)  -0.06   (.144) 
Proportion university degree  0.19** (.044)  0.24** (.044) 
Proportion social welfare  0.06   (.162)  0.09   (.160) 
LEVEL-1 FIXED COEFFICIENTS     
Controls same as in Table 2a, Model 3     
Proportion immigrants in the parish of origin    -0.53** (.169) 
Difference: % immigrants in parish of origin 
minus % immigrants in parish of destination 
  0.26   (.151) 
Number of moves    -0.04** (.001)  
     
RANDOM EFFECTS     
Variance in intercepts U0j  0.021  0.020 
Variance in ethnic gap 1 U1j  0.087  0.091 
Variance in ethnic gap 2 U2j  0.030  0.031 
Individual level variance Rij  0.740  0.737 
Number of individuals  188,724  188,724 
Number of schools  1,043  1,043 
 Note: ** = significant at the 1%-level; * = at the 5%-level. TABLE 5. School Fixed Effects Model of School Grades. The Impact of Ethnic Density 
(Proportion First- and Second Generation Immigrants Separately) on Ethnic Gap in Grades. 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses. 
  b-coefficient  Standard error 
Intercept    -0.01    (0.008) 
Ethnic gap 1: First generation vs. Swedish origin    -0.13
**    (0.019) 
Proportion first generation * Ethnic gap 1    -0.21    (0.118) 
Ethnic gap 2: Second generation vs. Swedish origin    -0.03    (0.018) 
Proportion second generation  * Ethnic gap 2    0.05    (0.136) 
   
Other individual-level coefficients same as in Table 2   
Number of individuals  188,724 
Number of schools  1,043 
Note: ** = significant at the 1%-level; * = at the 5%-level. 
  APPENDIX 
 
TABLE A1. Geographical origin of first generation immigrant pupils who left Swedish public 
comprehensive schools in 1998-99. Region of origin and the ten largest sending countries. 
 
Region of origin  %  Largest sending countries  % 
North and West Europe   21  Finland 
 
15 


















    Other nationalities  26 
Sum  100  Sum  100 
 




TABLE  A2.  Bivariate  correlations  (Pearson’s  r)  between  ethnic  density  (proportion  of  first-
generation immigrants, second generation immigrants, and these together) and average grades, 
proportion parents with university degree, and on social welfare, respectively. 
 
  Correlation with 
  Average grades   % university 
degree 
% on social 
welfare 
 
% first generation immigrants  -0.466    -0.055  0.852   
% second generation immigrants  -0.372    -0.117  0.517   
% first- plus second gen. imm.  -0.477    -0.090  0.798   
N  1,043    1,043  1,043   
 
 
 